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INTRODUcTION

Conflict of laws is in a state of flux. This is particularly true of that most difficult
area of the subject, which is frequently referred to as choice of law. Many fundamental rules in this area, that once were generally accepted, have been proved wrong
by recent experience.1 Some of the remaining rules are being subjected to increasing
criticism and doubt. More disconcerting is the fact that wide differences presently
exist with respect to underlying objectives and values. The suggestion has even
been made that all choice-of-law rules should be abandoned This surely is a time
for soul-searching and re-evaluation.
Conflict of laws was one of the first subjects to which the American Law
Institute gave its attention. Work on the original Restatement was commenced in
1923. At this time the teachings of Professor Joseph H. Beale, the Reporter, were at
their heyday. The vested rights theory, of which he was the principal exponent,
was widely accepted, and it was generally believed that the entire field could be
covered by a relatively small number of simple rules, as that the validity of a contract
is governed by the law of the place of contracting and that rights and liabilities in
tort are determined by the law of the place of injury Little wonder as a consequence
that the field was deemed ripe for restatement.
The situation had changed by the time the original Restatement was published
in final form in 1934. The vested rights theory, the foundation on which the
Restatement was constructed, was beginning to come under devastating attack from
Professor Walter Wheeler Cook4 and others.5 This increasing turmoil and doubt
had some effect upon the Restatement itself. Judge Goodrich once told the writer
that the reason why the original comments are so terse and laconic is that the
Advisers frequently disagreed with the reasons advanced by Professor Beale for his
rules although they did not object to the rules themselves. As a result, proposed
comments prepared by Professor Beale stating his reasons for the rules were fre-
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quently rejected while the rules themselves were usually allowed to stand. With
the exception of chapter eleven, which deals with the Administration of Estates,
of which Judge Goodrich was the Reporter, the rules of the original Restatement in
any event are simple, relatively few in number, and dogmatic. They are consistent
with the vested rights theory and they give little indication of the fluidity and of the
complexities and uncertainties of the subject.
It now seems evident, in the light of hindsight, that conflict of laws was not ripe
for restatement in the 1920's and i93o's, at least in the usual way. The subject
was then largely unexplored. This, rather than the Reporter's adherence to the
vested rights theory, is believed to be the principal reason for what is now recognized
to be the dogmatic and over-simplified character of the original Restatement. For it
is in the nature of men to seek certainty and simplicity in the law. They will wish to
regulate a field by a few simple rules if rules of this nature can be devised to handle
adequately the problems involved. And if a few simple rules will handle adequately
all, or at least the great majority, of problems that have arisen in a given field, men
will be tempted to believe that the same rules can satisfactorily be applied to handle
all other problems with which they may thereafter be faced. They will be loath to
attempt to conjure up problems that may arise in the future and that could not
adequately be handled by the suggested rules. In addition, Professor Beale had a
great sense of order and of logic. He had an instinctive liking for simple, dogmatic
rules and for theories that would lead to the adoption of such rules. Professor
Beale was by no means alone in this regard. His views were shared by such learned
and influential judges as Holmes' and Cardozo,7 and, it seems safe to say, by the
great majority of lawyers and law teachers of his time.
Following the appearance of the original Restatement in 1934, choice-of-law
questions came before the courts with increasing frequency. It soon became apparent
that many of the rules stated in this Restatement are wrong or at least so oversimplified as to be misleading. There was need for a complete revision, and work on
such a revision was commenced in 1952. The Reporter of the Restatement Second
and his Advisers have essentially two advantages over Professor Beale. They can
profit from the criticisms that were directed at his work, and they can seek guidance
from the large number of cases that have been decided, from the legislation that has
been enacted, and from the books and articles that have been written since the
appearance of the original Restatement. The Reporter and his Advisers, in short,
have the opportunity of being more learned simply because there is now more to
know.
On the other hand, revision of the Restatement at this time poses many difficulties.
More, perhaps much more, is known about choice of law than when Professor Beale
wrote. But this additional knowledge has not brought certainty and definiteness in
its wake. Instead it has brought disagreement, a renewed search for fundamental
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values, and perhaps more uncertainty than ever before. What we do know now
with fair certainty is that choice of law is too vast and complicated an area to be
governed by a relatively small number of simple rules of general application. What
is needed instead is a large number of relatively narrow rules that will be applicable
only in precisely defined situations 8 But, with rare exceptions, experience to date
is not sufficient to enable us to construct such rules or to identify all, or even most, of
the situations to which such rules will be applicable. Choice of law, even now,
is not ripe for restatement in the sense that it is rarely possible to state hard and fast
rules with the reasonable assurance based on precedent and the resources of human
reasoning and imagination that these rules will work well in all situations to which
they literally can be applied.
In these circumstances, one obvious goal of the Restatement Second must be not
to mislead. Care must be taken not to state rules that will prove wrong when
applied to new problems, for if this were to be done with any frequency the
Restatement would prove to be a hindrance, rather than an aid, in the further
development of the subject. Hence, as a general proposition, it is probably better
to err on the side of a rule that may be too fluid and uncertain in application than
to take one's chances with a precise and hard-and-fast rule that may be proved wrong
in the future. To be sure, a rule should not be stated so broadly that it would be
consistent with almost any result that a court might reach. Such a rule would in
effect be no rule at all. On the other hand, rules cannot bring certainty and
predictability to a subject in which these values do not exist. Of necessity, many
conflicts rules must be fluid in operation and leave much to be worked out by the
courts. A Restatement, of course, must provide whatever guidance is possible.
Hence the Restatement Second should state precise and definite rules in those few
area8 where this can be done. Elsewhere, broad, flexible rules must suffice. Such
rules can be helpful, particularly if accompanied by a statement in the comments of
the various policies that should guide the courts in applying them.
All rules of law, and choice-of-law rules are no exception, are the product of
policies. A rule is constructed initially to further what the law-maker conceives to
be the basic policies involved. And the ultimate success of a rule will depend upon
how effective it is in furthering these policies. During the early stages of a rule's
deveiopment, reference should constantly be made to the underlying policies to
determine whether the rule is in need of amendment and whether it should be given
a broad or narrow application. Only when the rule has become well established
can it safely be applied without conscious reference to the policies involved. What
has just been said is particularly applicable to choice-of-law rules. Few are well
established and many are in their early stages of development. A court in applying
these rules should have constant regard for the relevant policies. And the Restatement Second should state rules which in so far as possible will further them.
Some ten years ago Professor Cheatham and the writer published an article
S See Cavers, supra note x, at 165.
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setting forth some of the policies which in their opinion should guide the courts
in deciding choice-of-law questions and in formulating rules for choice of law.9
Time has not convinced the writer of the error of the views there set forth. It is
proposed here to review briefly these policies and to consider the extent to which
they are reflected in the rules set forth in the Restatement Second.
I
Tim PouciEs
The policies described in the article in the order of their mention are:
(i) The court must follow the dictates of its own legislature, provided these
dictates are constitutional.
If there is any convincing indication, on the face of a statute or otherwise, of the

desires of the enacting legislature with respect to the statute's range of application
in space, it is the duty of the courts, subject to constitutional restrictions, to give
the statute its intended application. Rarely, however, can this policy be applied in
practice, because legislatures normally do not give thought to what should be the
extraterritorial range of a statute but legislate only with the intrastate situation in
mind.
(2) Choice-of-law rules should be designed to make the internationaland interstate systems work well.1°

On occasion, this basic policy comes to the surface and we find the courts openly
seeking to effectuate it. In the United States, this policy is most clearly evident in
some opinions of the Supreme Court.

Perhaps the opinions dealing with the

statutory successor furnish the best example. 1 An insolvent estate can be handled
efficiently only by means of a unitary administration. Such an administration cannot
be afforded a multistate corporation by a chancery receiver who can sue to collect
assets and otherwise act in states not of his appointment only by the grace of those
states. To remedy this situation, the Supreme Court seized upon the concept of the
statutory successor and held in a series of decisions that such a successor must be
permitted under full faith and credit to sue in sister states to collect stockholder
assessments as well as other assets of the corporation. 2 Another example of the
policy openly at work is Hughes v. Fetter,13 where the Supreme Court was guided

by "the strong unifying principle embodied in the full faith and credit clause
looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights
'Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952).
10 "It [the forum] must temper its freedom to declare local policy and its scope with a sense for
harmonious interstate relations as well as for the justifiable expectations of the parties." Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TXAS L. Rav. 657, 675, (1959).
" See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (X935); Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112 (1934);
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912); Cheatham, Note, The Statutory Successor, the Receiver and
the Executor in Conflict of Laws, 44 COL-. L. Rav. 549 (1944).
12 See authorities cited in note i supra.
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created or recognized by the statutes of sister states"' 4 in determining that Wisconsin
was required by full faith and credit to entertain suit in its courts to recover for
a wrongful death that occurred in Illinois.

This policy is also thought to support the rule that, with rare exceptions, the law
of the state of incorporation governs the rights and liabilities of stockholders as well

as matters relating to a corporation's internal structure and administration."5 Particularly in this country, where stockholders of a single corporation are often scattered
among several states, it would be inconvenient indeed if stockholder rights and
liabilities were not governed by a single law. Likewise in this country, where a

corporation is likely to do business in many states, it would be almost intolerable
if the law of each of these states were to be applied to determine such matters as
the legality of a stock issue or of a dividend. There is need in such matters for the

application of a single law, and this need is met by the rule that the law of the
state of incorporation governs.' 6
Frequently, of course, it will be impossible to tell whether the needs of the
international and interstate systems would best be served by the resolution of a given
dispute one way or the other. In such instances, resort must be had to the other

policies mentioned below.
(3) The court should apply its own local law unless there is good reason for not
doing so.
A court should not assume the burden of ascertaining and applying the law of
another state without good reason. So a court should apply its own law to matters
that are not likely to affect the ultimate result of the case, such as rules of evidence
and methods of service. As to still other matters, a court should also apply its own
law unless it is required to do otherwise by one or more of the other policies
mentioned here.
(4) The court should consider the purpose of its relevant local law rule in
determining whether to apply its own law or the law of another state.
Every rule of law, whether embodied in a statute or in a common-law rule, was
formulated in order to achieve one or more purposes. A court should have regard for
these purposes in determining whether to apply its own rule or the law of another
state to the matter at hand. If the purposes sought to be achieved by a local statute
or common-law rule would be furthered by its application to an out-of-state occurrence, this is a weighty reason why such application should be made. It is only
to be expected that a court will favor its own local policies over those of other states.
For this reason primarily, a court will be inclined to give its own statutes and rules
4
d. at 612.
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ z66a, I82-186c (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1963); Reese
& Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Scope of Full Faith and
Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 5118 (1958); Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63
HAy. L. REV. 433 (950).
" See authorities cited in note 15 supra.
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a wider range of extraterritorial application than it will give to the statutes and

rules of other states.
It must be remembered that, in contrast to the situation dealt with in connection
with Policy No. i, we are here dealing with the usual case where the statute or

common-law rule was formulated solely with the intrastate situation in mind and
without thought to its possible extraterritorial application. 17

Here the court acts

as a free agent and has the pain of deciding whether the policies underlying a local
statute or rule should be furthered at the expense of other choice-of-law policies and
of the policies of the other interested states. The court must decide this question,
since it was not decided by the legislature which enacted the statute or by the court
which originally formulated the common-law rule.
There are two ways in which the court can approach the matter. Both will lead
the court to the same ultimate result and, in essence, involve only verbalistic differences. Discussion of the two approaches will be clearer if made to revolve around
the facts of a particular case. Bernkrant v.Fowler 8 has been chosen for this
purpose. In that case, the decedent had orally promised the plaintiffs that if they
would pay in advance of the due date a substantial part of the indebtedness they
owed him, he would provide by will that any part of the debt that remained unpaid
at his death should be cancelled. Relying upon this promise, the plaintiffs prepaid
a sufficient amount of the debt to meet the defendant's terms. About $6,ooo of the
debt remained unpaid at the time of the decedent's death but his will made no
provision for its cancellation. Accordingly, the plaintiffs brought suit in California
against the decedent's executor to enforce the oral agreement. It appeared that the
oral contract had been made in Nevada and that at all relevant times the plaintiffs
were domiciled in that state. The decedent died domiciled in California. It was uncertain whether he had been domiciled in California or in Nevada at the time when
the contract was made. The oral contract was found to be valid under Nevada law.
On the other hand, a California statute provided that an agreement to make any
is in writing...." 1"
provision by will is "invalid unless the same ...
Since the forum was a California court, it would be bound to follow, subject to
constitutional restrictions, any directions of the California legislature as to the
statute's range of application. The statute, however, contained no provision in this
regard and, presumably, had been enacted only with the intrastate situation in mind.
Almost surely, the enacting legislature had not given thought to the question whether
the statute should be applied to invalidate an oral contract made in Nevada with
Nevada domiciliaries. This being so, the first task of the court, since it was of
California, would be to ascertain the purpose, or purposes, that were sought to be
achieved by the statute. Almost certainly, the principal purpose of this statute was
to protect the estates of California decedents againts false claims. Perhaps it was also
" in the main, local judges as well as legislators make law with the local scene only in mind...."
Traynor, supra note io, at 671.
18 55 Cal.2d 588, 360 P.2d 9o6 (196i).
" CAL. CIv. CODE § 1624(6).
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designed to protect the California courts against perjured testimony. In either event,
the purpose, or purposes, underlying the statute would be furthered by having the
statute applied to invalidate the Nevada contract. This, however, would not be the
end of the matter. Since the legislature had not spoken on the point, the court, as
stated above, would have to decide for itself what range of application the statute
should have. The court would have to determine whether application of the
statute in order to further its underlying purposes was worth the price that would be
entailed.
One of the two ways in which the court could approach the question would be.to
admit frankly that it has the power of decision and then to inquire whether the value
of furthering the purposes sought to be achieved by the statute is outweighed in the
particular case by other choice-of-law policies and by the policies of other states.
This was the approach taken by Justice Traynor. He stated at the outset that
California had an interest in having its statute applied but that
the Legislature, however, is ordinarily concerned with enacting laws to govern purely
local transactions, and it has not spelled out the extent to which [this] statute... is to apply
to a contract having substantial contacts with another state. Accordingly, we must
determine its scope in the light of applicable principles of the law of conflict of laws. 20
Justice Traynor continued by saying that it was possible that the decedent had been
domiciled in Nevada at the time when the contract was made. If so,
the basic policy of upholding the expectations of the parties by enforcing contracts valid
under the only law apparently applicable would preclude an interpretation of our statute
of frauds that would make it apply to and thus invalidate the contract because Granrud
[the decedent] moved to California and died here.2 '
The same result would follow even if the decedent had been domiciled at all
relevant times in California. Nevada had a "substantial interest" in having its law
applied, since the plaintiffs were domiciled in that state, the contract was made there
and was performed there by the plaintiffs and "involved the refinancing of obligations arising from the sale of Nevada land and secured by interests therein." 22
California also would have an obvious interest; and the problem facing the court,
as Justice Traynor saw it, was to weigh "the policy to protect the reasonable
expectations of the parties" against the policy represented by the California Statute
of Frauds.as He held that the latter policy must give way because the plaintiffs at
the time they made the contract would have no way of knowing whether the
decedent would die domiciled in California or in some other state. "Unless they
could rely on their own law, they would have to look to the laws of all jurisdictions
to which Granrud [the decedent] might move regardless of where he was domiciled
'
when the contract was made."24
In effect, therefore, Justice Traynor held that the
2o 55 Cal.2d at 594, 36o P.2d at 909.
Id.at 594-95, 360 P.2d at 909.
IId. at 595, 360 P.2d at 9io.
IId. at 596, 36o P.2d at 9o.
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policies underlying the California Statute of Frauds must bow before the choice-oflaw policies (a) of protecting the justified expectations of the parties; (b) of applying the law of the state of dominant interest; and (c) of upholding the fundamental
policy underlying the local law field involved which, in the case of contracts, is to
uphold contractual obligations assumed in good faith.
The other way for a court to approach the question is to pretend that its only
task is one of statutory interpretation or, in other words, that it need only inquire
whether the legislature did or did not intend to have the statute applied to the
particular state of facts. If, as stated above, the legislature did express an intention
on the subject, it is the duty of the courts to follow it, subject always to constitutional
restrictions. But in the situation now under consideration, the legislature never
thought about the matter at all. Hence a court following this approach must
inquire what the legislature would have intended, or should have intended, had it
thought about the problem. Since the court will naturally assume that the legislature
was composed of reasonable men, it will almost inevitably suppose that the legislature
would have been moved by the same considerations as would have moved the court.
Hence if the court believes that the statute should not be applied because of such
choice-of-law policies as protecting the justified expectations of the parties or attaining uniformity of result, it will assume that this must likewise have been the
intention of the legislature. So, for example, we find Justice Traynor saying in
Bernkrant v.Fowler that, because of the policy of upholding the expectations of the
parties, "the California statute of frauds, in the absence of a plain legislative directive
to the contrary, could not reasonably be interpreted as applying to the contract." 2'
Both approaches involve the same considerations and will lead to the same
result. In both, it is the court that decides whether or not to apply the local statute
to the foreign state of facts. The only difference is that a court following the first
approach will frankly state that it is making the decision, while a court that adheres
to the second approach will pretend to be effectuating the intentions of the
legislature.
(5)Choice of law rules should seek to achieve certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result.
These are basic values throughout all areas of the law. They can, however, be
purchased at too great a price. In a rapidly developing area, such as choice of law,
it is often more important that there should be experimentation with new rules
than that certainty and predictability of result should be assured through continued
adherence to existing rules as to whose essential correctness there is legitimate
doubt. Certainty and predictability are of particular importance in areas where the
parties are likely to give advance thought to the legal consequences of their transactions. This is recognized, within limits at least, by existing rules of choice of law.
So we find the courts virtually agreed that the validity of a will in so far as it
concerns movables is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at the time of
'Id. at 595, 360 P.2d at

909.
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land.2 T

The courts likedeath26 and by the law of the situs in so far as it concerns
wise seek to apply a law that will sustain the validity of either a testamentary or an
inter vivos trust2 And in the area of contracts, where choice-of-law rules are
uncertain, some measure of predictability and certainty is achieved by allowing the
parties, within broad limits, to select the law to govern the validity and effect of their
29

contract.

Uniformity of result is of pre-eminent importance when the transfer of an
aggregate of movables, situated in two or more states, is involved. Here we find
the courts, with considerable unanimity, adopting choice-of-law rules that peimit
such transfers to be governed by a single law. So, as stated above, the law of the
decedent's domicile at the time of death is applied to determine the validity of his
will in so far as it deals with movables; 3 ° the same law is likewise applied to
determine the distribution of movables upon intestacy. 31 Also, with some exceptions, the law of the transferor's domicile is applied to determine the validity of an
assignment of movables for the benefit of creditors.3 2 Uniformity of result is equally
important in the case of marital property. For this reason, in part, the law of the
spouses' domicile is applied to determine 3marital interests in movables, irrespective
of where these may have been acquiredV
Uniformity of result, or the application by all states of the same choice-of-law
rule, is also desirable in order to avoid forum shopping. It is not to be expected,
however, that differences in choice-of-law rules can ever be entirely eradicated.
Likewise, freedom from forum shopping is not the most important value of all and
should not be purchased at the sacrifice of all other relevant policies and at the risk
of hindering the development of better rules of choice of law.
(6) The court should seek to protect the justified expectations of the parties.
This policy has already been seen at work in Justice Traynor's opinion in
Bernkrant v. Fowler. 4 It can only be operative in those situations where the parties
give thought in advance to the legal consequences of their transactions. It is in
part because of this policy that the parties are free, within broad limits, to choose the
law to govern the validity of their contract,"3 that the courts seek to apply a law
that will sustain the validity of a trust of movables,3" and within narrower limits,
"oRESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 306 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
27 Id. § 249.
28
See, e.g., Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937); WALTER W. LAND,
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10See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955); RESTATEMENT
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the validity of a contract,37 and that the law of the last domicile is almost invariably
applied to govern transfers of movables upon death 3 To some extent, this policy
of protecting justified expectations is but another way of expressing the policy
discussed immediately above. A person's expectations are likely to be disappointed
if choice-of-law rules do not lead to uniformity, certainty, and predictability of result.
It must be remembered that the policy of protecting the parties' expectations is
but one choice-of-law policy and will, on occasion, be outweighed by other policies.
This may occur when the court is faced with the problem of deciding whether or
not to apply the law of a state which is frankly designed to defeat expectations,
as is true of the Statute of Frauds, 9 of the Rule Against Perpetuities,4 ° and of rules
designed to protect persons against exploitation, as in the case of usury laws 41 and
of small-loan legislation 4
(7)The court should seek to apply the law of the state of dominant interest
In general, it is fitting that the state whose interests are most deeply affected
should have its law applied. Partly for this reason, the law of the situs is applied
to determine the validity and effect of a conveyance of land,4" and the law of the
spouses' common domicile is applied to determine the validity of their marriage"
and their respective interests in movables acquired during coverture3Y Which is
the state of dominant interest may depend upon the issue involved. So if a
husband injures his wife in a state other than that of their domicile, it may be that
the state of conduct and injury has the greatest interest in determining such questions as whether the husband's conduct was negligent or otherwise tortious and
whether the wife was contributorily negligent. On the other hand, the state of the
spouses' domicile is the state of dominant interest when it comes to the question
whether the husband should be held immune from tort liability to his wife 4 It
should be for this state to determine whether marital harmony is preserved by
making spouses immune from tort liability to each other and, if so, whether granting
such immunity is worth the price.
Similarly, suppose that a driver and a guest passenger, who are both domiciled
in state X, start upon a motor trip which is intended to take them from X to a
point in state Y and then back to X, and that the guest sustains injury in an accident
in state Y. Whether the driver was negligent, and the guest contributorily negligent,
" See, e.g., Pritchard v. Norton, io6 U.S. 124 (1882); Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,
59 CoL m. L. REv. 973, 1171 (z959); REsrATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 322b, comment b
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 196o).
8 REvSTAATEmENT (SECoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 303, 306 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
"See Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (x895); Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 3o5 N.Y.
288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953); but cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 588, 360 P.2d 9o6 (1961).
"See authorities cited in note 28 supra.
(SECoND), CONFLicr OF LAws S 3 3 4d (Tent. Draft No. 6 (196o).
"RETATEMENT
"See, e.g., Kinney Loan and Finance Co. v. Sumner, 159 Neb. 57, 65 N.V.2d 240 (1954).
(SECoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 215 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
'REsrATEmENT
(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 121, 122, 132 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
"RESTATEMENT
"RESTATEmENT
(SECOND), CoNrLICr OF LAws § 290 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 5959).

"See,
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should, normally at least, be determined by the law of Y, which is in the state both
of conduct and injury. On the other hand, X law should be applied to determine
the circumstances, if any, under which a guest passenger can recover damages from
the driver for injuries caused by the latter's negligence. This is an issue with which
concern and with respect to which X is dearly the state of dominant
Y has little
interest 7
Sometimes two or more states will have nearly equal interests in the decision of
a case. If so, the policy under consideration can afford little assistance in the
determination of the choice-of-law issue. It should also be stated that this is but one
policy, which on occasion will be outweighed by others.
(8) Choice-of-law rules should be simple and easy to apply.

The importance of this policy should not be overemphasized. Pushed to its
logical conclusion, it would lead to a rule that all cases should be decided according
to the local law of the forum. The policy does, however, have some significance.
It furnishes perhaps the principal support for the often stated rule that liability in
tort is determined by the law of the state where defendant's conduct first resulted
in injury.
(9) The court should seek to further the fundamental policy underlying the local
law field involved.

Situations sometimes arise in which the policies of the interested states are
largely the same but in which there nevertheless are minor differences between their
relevant local law rules. In such instances, there is good reason for the court to
apply the law of that state which will best achieve the fundamental policy underlying
the local law field involved.
The usury cases provide an excellent example 8 Usury laws are designed to
protect borrowers against excessive interest rates. Most states have laws of this sort,
and these laws differ only slightly among themselves with respect to the maximum
rate of interest that can legally be charged. In these circumstances, most courts will
sustain a contract against the charge of usury if it is valid under the law of any
state having a substantial contact with the transaction. This is done in order to give
effect to the fundamental policy underlying the field of contracts, which is that
promises should be performed. The rule seems a desirable one since the policies
of the interested states are essentially the same, and hence the interests of one state
cannot seriously be infringed by the application of another's law.
Another example of the policy at work can be found in the field of trusts,
where the courts will go to considerable lengths to apply a law that will uphold the
validity of a trust against the charge that it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.4 9
The policy of all states on the subject of perpetuities is essentially the same and their
laws differ only as to the length of time during which the power of alienation can
" Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
' RESrATEMENT (SacoND), CONFLiCT OF LAWS 5 33 4 d (Tent. Draft No. 6, i96o).

"See note 28 supra.
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be suspended, as lives in being, or lives in being plus twenty-one years. Here again
the courts feel it more important to further the fundamental policy of trusts, which
is to carry out the wishes of the settlor, than to apply the Rule Against Perpetuities of
any particular state.
This policy is of less compelling force when there are significant differences in
the relevant rules of the interested states. Finally, it can be of no assistance when
several policies, none more fundamental than the rest, underlie the given legal field.
An example is the law of torts, which, among other things, is designed to compensate the injured party, to deter tortious conduct, and to establish standards of
rightful behavior."

(Io) The court should seek to attain justice in the individual case.
Usually, it will be difficult to tell where true justice lies. Also justice in the
individual case, if it were given the most significant role, would be totally disruptive
of all legal rules. Nevertheless, no judge will willingly reach a result which he deems
to be unjust. And to some undefined extent, judges undoubtedly manipulate
choice-of-law rules to permit them to apply the law of the state which to their
mind will lead to the best result.
It is believed that this policy is most likely to carry the day in situations in which
normal choice-of-law rules would lead to the application of the law of a state
which adopts a minority view that is out of tune with the times.," Here it is only
to be expected that the court will search for a choice-of-law rule that would lead to
52
the application of the law of some other state. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.
is a case in point. There the court resorted to choice-of-law rules of dubious merit
for the frankly avowed purpose of avoiding application of the provision limiting
the amount of recovery contained in the wrongful death statute of Massachusetts,
the state where the injury occurred and presumably the negligent conduct as well.
II
COMMENT ON THE POLICIES

With one exception, none of the policies described above is of such paramount

importance as to outweigh all of the rest. The exception is Policy No. I, which
requires a court to follow the dictates of its legislature provided that these dictates
are constitutional. As previously stated, however, this policy can rarely be applied
in practice, because legislatures normally legislate only with the intrastate situation
inmind and do not give thought to the extent, if any, to which a statute should
be applied to situations involving foreign facts. 53
Decision of a choice-of-law question is easy when all, or most, of the policies
point in a single direction. Decision becomes difficult when this is not the case.
50
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What is needed in this latter situation is the development of choice-of-law rules that
will give effect to what are the most important policies, or policy, for the precise
purpose at hand. Life would, of course, be easier if one policy always stood out
from among the rest. But this simply is not true. The relative importance of the
policies varies from situation to situation, and choice-of-law rules must recognize

this fact.
Let us take in this connection Policy No. 4, which is that a court should consider
the purpose sought to be achieved by its relevant local law rule in determining
whether to apply this rule, or the law of another state, in the decision of a particular
case. The extent to which application of the local law rule would result in the
sacrifice of other choice-of-law policies, and the relative importance of these policies,
will naturally vary from situation to situation. These variables will be considered
by the courts in arriving at a choice-of-law decision.
For example, courts in this country, in the absence of an express legislative
directive to the contrary, will apply the law of a decedent's domicile at the time
of death to determine either the validity of his will with respect to movables or how
these movables should be distributed in the event of an intestacy. 4 The courts will
apply this law to local movables even though their own rules are different and
even though application of these latter rules would benefit local beneficiaries. The
law of the last domicile is applied in this situation because of the obvious desirability
of having the distribution of an estate of movables governed by a single law. The
interests of all states would suffer if this were not the case. Likewise, and again
in the absence of express legislative direction to the contrary, a court will usually
not apply its own recording statutes to subordinate in favor of a local purchaser a
security interest in a chattel that was brought into the state without the knowledge
or consent of the security holder. 5 This rule is designed to encourage the free
movement of goods from state to state. It is deemed to be in the interest of all
states that security interest should be protected in this instance. On the other hand,
in situations in which uniformity of result is not so important and where other
significant choice-of-law policies do not stand in the way, there is greater justification for a court's applying its own local rule in order to further the purposes sought
to be achieved by the rule. An example is Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.5
where the New York Court of Appeals authorized application of the New York
rule of damages in a suit to recover for the wrongful death of a New York domiciliary that occurred in Massachusetts. Uniformity of result is not of transcendent
importance in tort and wrongful death cases for the reason, among others, that
persons are unlikely to act on the assumption that in the event of an accident their
rights and liabilities in tort will be governed by the law of a particular state.
"' RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 306 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959); Griswold, Renvoi
Revisited, 5 HARv. L. REV. ii65, 1195 (1938).
" See, e.g., Metro-Plan, Inc. v. Kotcher-Turner, Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296 N.W. 304 (941);
REsTATEmENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 268, 275 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
VS9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.,d 526 (ig6x).
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Partial justification, at least, for the Kilberg decision can be found in this fact.
A somewhat similar situation exists in the area of contracts. Here choice-of-law
rules, in the absence of an express provision on the subject in the contract, are uncertain in the extreme. Because of this uncertainty, uniformity of result is not
easily attainable and the parties are unlikely to have had clear expectations with
respect to the governing law. These considerations provide the court of an interested
state with some justification for applying its own local law to a contract in order to
further a local policy. On the other hand, as Bernkrant v. Fowler" teaches us,
the parties will naturally expect that the obligations of a contract will be fulfilled.
This fact should make a court hesitate to apply its own local rule to strike down
a contract which has its most significant relationship with another state.
It is also to be expected that the need of applying a local rule to foreign facts in
order to further the purpose of the rule will vary from case to case. The intensity
of this need is another factor that the court should consider in determining whether
or not to apply its local rule.
To reiterate, no one policy, except the first, is of such paramount importance that
it should always be given effect. Not only will the relative importance of these
policies vary from one legal category to another, but each individual case is likely
to present a different grouping of policies. Choice-of-law rules must eventually be
developed that in so far as possible will take account of these variations. No single
approach, no constant obeisance to a single policy will do. We must have narrower
and more numerous choice-of-law rules.5 The task of constructing such rules
will not be easy and, in many instances, must be based on greater experience than we
presently have. Such difficulties are only to be expected in an area that presents so
many complexities as does choice of law.
III
THE RESTATEMENT SECOND

Two things should be stated by way of introduction to a discussion of the extent
to which the policies described above are reflected in the rules of the Restatement
Second. The first is that the Restatement states rules rather than policies. The
policies are mentioned with some frequency in the Comments in order to explain
and to justify the black-letter rules; they are not, however, referred to in the rules
themselves.
The second is that the Restatement is written from the viewpoint of a neutral
forum which has no interest of its own to protect and is seeking only to apply the
most appropriate law. This approach is taken for the reason among others that
some of the considerations that will induce a court to apply its own local law rather
than that of another state are many and varied and are not susceptible to restatement. It can, of course, be said in criticism that cases rarely arise in truly neutral
'755 Cal.2d 588, 36o P.2d 9o6 (196z).
"SSee Cavers, supra note 1, at 165.

CONFLICT OF LAWS AND TIM RESTATEMENT SECOND

693

forums. This may well be true. Yet the fact remains that the approach adopted
appears to be the only practicable one. Also even an interested forum will usually
be guided by what it conceives to be correct rules of choice of law. Somewhere
it will be made clear in the final version of the Restatement that the court of an
interested state will depart from the rules stated in obedience to an express legislative
mandate and on occasion, in the absence of such a mandate, in order to further an
important local policy.
Since the Restatement is written from the viewpoint of a neutral forum, Policies
No. I and No. 4 are often irrelevant. These policies are (a) that a court should
follow the dictates of its own legislature and (b) that a court should give consideration to the purpose sought to be achieved by its relevant local law rule in
determining whether to apply the rule in a case involving out-of-state facts. These
policies have a bearing on the rules of the Restatement only when the forum is
directed to apply the renvoi doctrine, that is, to refer both to the local and the
conflicts law of the state of the governing law in order to decide the case in exactly
the same way as a court of the latter state would have done. In these situations,
the forum must determine whether a court of the state of the governing law would
have been led by Policies No. i and No. 4, or by still other considerations, to apply
its own local law to the decision of the case. Questions to which the Restatement
directs application of the renvoi doctrine include (a) the validity of a marriage,
governed by the whole (local and conflicts) law of the spouses' common domicile,6 9
(b) the transfer of land or of a chattel, governed by the whole law of the situs,60
(c) marital interests in movables, governed by the whole law of the spouses'
domicile at the time of their acquisition,6 ' (d) the distribution upon death of land,
governed by the whole law of the situs, 2 and (e) the distribution upon death of
movables governed by the whole law of the decedent's last domicile."'
The Restatement makes clear that a court of the state of the governing law
would give effect to Policy No. I, that is to say, would follow the express commands
of its legislature in determining whether to apply its own law or the law of another
state in the decision of the case. So it is said, for example, that a court of the
state of the governing law, if directed to do so by statute, would sustain the validity
of a will with respect to formalities by application of the law of the state where
the will was executed.64 Little is said about Policy No. 4, on the other hand, because
the considerations that will induce a court, in the absence of a legislative mandate,
to apply its local rule in furtherance of a local policy are not susceptible to restatement. Mention is made, however, of situations in which a court will not apply its
local law in deference to one or more choice-of-law policies. Examples already
mentioned are that (a) courts will not, in the absence of an express legislative
80
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directive to the contrary, apply their local recording acts to the prejudice of a security

interest in the chattel which has been brought into the state without the knowledge
or consent of the security holder,65 (b) the courts of the state of a chattel's situs, again
in the absence of an express legislative directive to the contrary, will look to the
law of the owner's last domicile to determine inheritance rights in the chattel,"0
and (c) courts will go to considerable lengths to apply a law that will sustain the
validity of a trust against the charge that it violates the Rule against Perpetuities. 7
Still another example is to be found in the reluctance of the courts of the state of
the spouses' common domicile to apply a local rule to invalidate a marriage good
under the law of the state of celebration."
It is said in the Restatement that the renvoi doctrine should not be applied to
contracts 09 and torts.7 ° Hence Policies No. i and No. 4 have no application to the
Restatement rules directed to these two areas, which in all probability present the
most difficult choice-of-law problems.
Choice-of-law rules are to be found in those chapters of the Restatement which
are directed to status, principally marriage and legitimation (chapter 5), agency and
partnerships (chapter 5a), corporations (chapter 6), property (chapter 7), contracts
(chapter 8), torts (chapter 9), and substance-procedure (chapter 12). Work on
chapter twelve has not yet been commenced; hence this area will not here be discussed. By and large, fairly definite choice-of-law rules are stated with respect to
status, corporations, and property. This is because the courts are generally agreed
on what choice-of-law policies are entitled to the greatest weight in these areas.
According to the Restatement, the state of the spouses' common domicile has
the ultimate voice in determining the validity of their marriage. 7 ' This is because
this state has the dominant interest in the marital status of its domiciliaries (Policy
No. 7). For this reason, the renvoi doctrine is applicable and the courts of other
states will seek to decide the case in exactly the same way as would have been done
by the courts of the state of the common domicile. On the other hand, the
courts of the common domicile will usually uphold the validity of a marriage
that is good under the law of the state of celebration. This is done in order
to protect the expectations of the parties (Policies No. 5 and No. 6), and because
of the general policy in favor of upholding the validity of marriage (Policy No. 9).
Questions of legitimation are said by the Restatement to be governed by the law of
the domicile of the parent against whom the child claims legitimacy.72 This state
will normally at least have as great an interest in the matter as any other (Policy
No. 7). Likewise, application of its law may often be required by considerations of
e Id. §§ 268, 275.
0
Id. §§ 303, 306.
17 Id. S 294, comment e;
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justice to the parent involved (compare Policy No. io). The renvoi doctrine is also

said to apply in this situation. If the courts of the state of the parent's domicile
would determine the question of legitimation by reference to the law of another
state, the forum will probably do likewise.
Questions involving the internal affairs of corporations are said, with one possible
exception, to be governed by the law of the state of incorporation.73 Such questions

include the rights and liabilities of stockholders, the liability of directors and officers
to the corporation and its stockholders, stockholders' and directors' meetings, the
election of directors, and the validity of stock issues and of dividend payments.
Frequently, the state of incorporation will be the state of dominant interest. But the
rule is also applicable in situations where the corporation's contacts with the incorporating state are relatively slight and where its principal place of business is
elsewhere. Explanation for the rule can be found in the needs of the situation,
namely that it is of the utmost importance that matters involving a corporation's
internal affairs should be governed by a single law and the state of incorporation is
not only easily ascertainable but is also the one that the parties would presumably
expect to have applied. A further reason for the rule is that choice-of-law rules
should here be definite and clear because this is an area where the parties and their
lawyers will normally give deep consideration to possible consequences of proposed
conduct before they embark upon it. Hence it would appear that choice-of-law
rules are here the product of Policies No. 2 (needs of the interstate system), No. 5
(certainty, predictability and uniformity of result), No. 6 (expectations of the
parties), and No. 8 (ease of application). These policies likewise dictate that questions of this sort should be decided in accordance with the local law of the state
of incorporation.
Turning now to property, transfers of land are said to be governed by the law
of the situs.74 This is the state of dominant interest (Policy No. 7), and the rule
leads to certainty and uniformity of result (Policy No. 5) and is easy to apply
(Policy No. 8). Usually, the courts of this state would apply their own local law
in deciding the case. In the rare situations in which they would look to the law of
another state, as where they are directed by statute to sustain the validity of a will
as to formalities if it meets the requirements of some other state, the forum will do
likewise.
Chattels present more difficult problems. Because chattels can be moved from
state to state, no state is likely to have the same degree of interest in a chattel that
it has in local land.75 Nevertheless, the Restatement provides that the law of the
situs governs. The clearest situation is that in which, after a security interest, as a
conditional sale or chattel mortgage, has been created in the chattel in one state, the
chattel is removed to a second state and there is the subject of a second transaction,
as a sale to a bona fide purchaser. Here the law of the second state is applied to
'
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76 If
determine the effect of the later transaction upon the prior security interest.
the chattel was brought into the state without the knowledge or consent of the
security holder, the courts of the second state, in the absence of an express legislative
directive to the contrary, will not, as stated above, apply their local recording act
to subordinate the interests of the security holder to those of the bona fide purchaser.P
The forum, in any event, is directed by the Restatement to apply whichever law
would have been applied by the courts of the second state in deciding the case.
These rules rest in part upon the interest of the state of the situs (Policy No. 7).
To a greater extent they stem from the policy of protecting the expectations of the
parties (Policy No. 6), since one who deals with a chattel would naturally expect
that the law of the state where the chattel is situated at the time would be applied to
determine the interests that he acquires. On the other hand, he would also realize
that the chattel might be moved to another state and that in this event the law
of the other state might be applied to determine the nature of the interests acquired
by one who there dealt with the chattel. Also, of course, the rule is easy to apply
(Policy No. 7) and leads to certainty, uniformity, and predictability of result
(Policy No. 5).
The problem becomes more difficult when the controversy with respect to the
chattel is between parties to a single transaction, as when the issue is whether a
given transaction resulted in the outright sale of the chattel or in a chattel mortgage
or whether the security holder has sold the chattel in violation of the debtor's rights
of redemption.78 Here the question is whether the governing law should be that
of the chattel's situs at the time of the transaction or the law which governs the
contractual relationship between the parties. This would be the law of the state
which has the most significant relationship with the parties and the transaction 7 0
Much can be said in favor of the latter solution. It provides desirable flexibility
and would appear to be in line with the policy that looks towards application of the
law of the state of dominant interest (Policy No. 7). On the other hand, application
of the law of the situs would find support in the policies of certainty, uniformity, and
predictability of result (Policy No. 5) and ease of application (Policy No. 8). The
Restatement presently provides that the law of the situs governs, but says that the
courts of this state might apply the law that governs the parties' agreement in
determining their interests in the chattel 0 In this event, the forum is directed to
do likewise. The authorities are uncertain in this area,"' and it may be the Restatement will be amended in its final form to make solely applicable the law that
governs the parties' agreement.
The situation is different when the transfer of an aggregate of movables situated
"eId. S§ 268-271, 274-278.
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in two or more states is involved. Here it is obviously desirable that the transfer
should be governed by a single law. So, the Restatement provides that the validity
and effect of a will of movables and the distribution of movables upon intestacy are
governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at the time of death,82 marital
interests in movables acquired during coverture are governed by the law of the
spouses' domicile at the time of acquisition, 3 and an assignment of chattels for the
84
benefit of creditors is governed by the law of the transferor's domicile at the time.
Likewise, the validity and administration of a trust of movables situated in two or
more states are said to be governed by a single lawY5 These rules are clearly in line
with the policy of making the international and interstate systems work well
(Policy No. 2) and of the policy in favor of uniformity of result (Policy No. 5).
Nothing will here be said about the Restatement rules on agency and partnerships8 6 These rules are based in large part upon choice-of-law rules relating to
contracts and torts. These latter rules will now be discussed.
Contracts is an area in which the parties are likely to give advance thought to
the legal consequences of their conduct. There is real need here for choice-of-law
rules that will bring certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result (Policy No. 5)
and that will protect the parties' expectations (Policy No. 6). These values are
achieved in some degree by the Restatement rule that, subject to certain limitations,
the parties may choose the law to govern the validity and effect of their contract8 7
Where the parties have not made such a choice, the Restatement provides that the
governing law is that of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the contract8 8 The effort is made in the case of particular contracts to state what
contact, as the situs of land in contracts dealing with land, will be considered most
important by the courts in determining the state of most significant relationship8 9
The rule of most significant relationship is undoubtedly too vague to offer firm
guidance in situations where the important contacts are divided more or less equally
among two or more states. It is believed, however, that no more definite rule
can be stated in view of the relatively unexplored state of the field and the existing
confusion among the authorities. A more definite rule would almost surely be
proved wrong in the course of time and might actually impede constructive progress.
There are many different kinds of contracts and a vasdy greater multitude of
issues relating to contracts. The laws of the various states also differ markedly as to
the requirements that these contracts must fulfill in order to be valid and entitled
to legal effect. Also the contacts which a contract may have with two or more
states are likely to differ markedly from case to case. Experience has shown that
"' RESrATEmENT (SacoND),
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this large and complicated area cannot adequately be handled by a few single rules.
What is needed instead is a large number of rules that are each directed to a relatively
narrow situation. Experience to date is not sufficient to permit the formulation of
many such rules at the present time. The task of doing so must be left to the
future. These rules will have to be developed on a case-to-case basis in the light
of all of the policies outlined above. It would, of course, be far easier if it were
possible to say that consideration need be given to only one of these policies, as
that a court should apply its own law when to do so would further a local interest
or, in order to protect the expectations of the parties, should apply a law which
will validate the contract.9 0 Such a view, however, would vastly oversimplify the
problem and would probably prove to be as incorrect as the equally simple, and
much criticized, rule of the original Restatement that the validity of a contract is
governed by the law of the place of contracting.
A rule of validation, for example, would have much superficial attraction and
could marshal considerable authority in its support. Undoubtedly, courts on many
occasions have sought to uphold a contract by application of a favorable law.0 1
But it must be remembered that there are many kinds of contracts and that some
of them may be deemed socially undesirable or at least less desirable than others.
Likewise, all states have laws which, largely for the purpose of protecting the weak
against the strong, limit the parties' freedom to contract by invalidating certain kinds
of contractual provisions. Whether a court will seek to apply a validating law in a
given case will depend upon the kind of contract or contractual provision involved
and also upon the degree of interest which the state of the validating law has in
the parties and the transaction.
A rule of validation would also be impossible to apply in the familiar situation
where a party claims that he has been relieved of his contractual obligation through
the operation of a particular provision in the contract, as that he shall not be held
liable in the event of a particular occurrence, or that no suit shall be brought later
than a specified time after the occurrence of a loss or injury. 2 Here if the court
validates the provision it must perforce hold the obligation ineffective. In order
to uphold the obligation, the court must invalidate the provision. In either case,
the court must both validate and invalidate. No principle of validation can furnish
it with an effective guide.
There is no easy short cut. In each case, all of the policies must be considered
and a choice-of-law rule developed that will give effect to what are the most
important policies for the precise purpose at hand. It is felt as a result that the
Restatement cannot usually do more in the case of contracts which contain no
choice-of-law provision than to state the general principle of state of most significant
relationship in the black letter rule and then to mention in the comments the more
important considerations that should motivate the courts in arriving at a decision
90 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 37.
9 See, e.g., Pritchard v. Norton, io6 U.S. 124 (1882).
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CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE REsTATmmNT SECOND

699

and in general to give whatever guidance is possible. At the very least, such black
letter rules and comments will not mislead an unwary court or litigant into believing
that the area is governed by well-settled rules.
Torts present different considerations. Rarely do parties contemplate the consequences of tortious conduct, and rarely if at all will they give thought to the question
of what law would be applied to govern their conduct if it were to result in injury.
In other words, uniformity, certainty, and predictability of result are not as important
values in this area as they are in contracts. Until recently, the courts with rare

unanimity applied the law of the place of injury to determine rights and liabilities
in tort.' Recently, however, several important courts have either expressed dis4
satisfaction with the rule or else have reached results that are inconsistent with itf
This trend will probably continue and it is thought that the rule will become eroded,
at least in part, in the course of time. As a result, the Restatement has adopted in
this area also the rule of most significant relationship.° The effort is also made, as
in the case of contracts, to state with respect to particular torts what contact, as the
principal location of the defendant's conduct in the case of alienation of affections,
will be considered most important by the courts in determining the state of most
significant relationship.e
This rule of most significant relationship, at the very least, will not stand in the
way of progress. It should aid in inducing the courts to depart from the place of
injury rule in situations where this is desirable. And it should make clear to the
lawyer and litigant that it can no longer be expected that the place of injury rule
will always be applied.
CONCLUSION

It is hoped that the policies outlined in the first part of this paper are correctly
reflected in the rules of the Restatement Second. Fairly precise rules have in general
been stated in the case of status, corporations, and property, since, on the basis of
present knowledge, it is deemed possible to identify and to give effect to the most
important policies in these areas. Present experience, on the other hand, with respect
to contracts and torts does not permit the formulation of definite rules with any
reasonable assurance that these rules would give appropriate effect to what are here
the most significant policies. Hence the more general and more flexible formulation
of "state of most significant relationship" has been resorted to. Presumably more
definite and precise rules can be stated after more experience has accumulated.
That will be the task of future Restatements.
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